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More powerful managers make more important decisions. Therefore, firm
performance is more informative about the abilities of such managers, who,
realizing that they are more visible, are more eager to improve performance.
If this reputation effect exists, how should firms allocate power? I analyze
the optimal allocation of power and derive implications for several issues that
often arise in management practice: the choice of departmentation criteria,
the importance given to seniority, and the width of job definitions. Finally, I
show that the model is consistent with the empirical evidence on managerial
succession.
1. Introduction
Powerful managers make decisions that have a potentially large
impact on firm performance—design and implementation of large
investment projects, launching of new products, or management of
new processes—and less powerful managers make fewer or less
important decisions. A consequence of this simple fact is that man-
agers with more responsibilities tend to be more motivated. Another
consequence is that powerful managers are more visible: any action
they take is more easily observed by outsiders. Some CEOs quickly
reach the headlines of the business press or, just as quickly, disappear
from them, but less powerful managers are rarely in the spotlight.
In this article, I relate these two observations: I argue that, being
more visible, more powerful managers realize that they are more
accountable, and will try to increase firm value in order to build a
good reputation. The article is based on the premise that power is
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a limited resource: when a firm wants to reallocate power, it has to
take some power away from one manager and give it to another.
Therefore, the firm has to trade off the increased incentives of one of
the managers against the reduced incentives of the other. I argue that
this trade-off depends on the managers’ career concerns: when a firm
divides power among several managers, it should take into account
that power makes managers more visible to the market, and that
more visible managers make decisions that are better aligned with
shareholders’ interests. I show this with a model of team production
and career concerns based on Holmstrom (1982a,b) and Jeon (1996).
In this model, managers are endowed with (general and specific)
human capital, the value of which cannot be perfectly evaluated by
their current employer or by the labor market, but can be estimated
by using information on firm performance. The managers’ choices
are influenced by their reputational concerns.
The idea that power motivates managers is not new, but the
role of reputation has received little attention.1 For example, in the
incomplete-contracting literature (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and
Moore, 1990; Rajan and Zingales, 1998), the role of power is to moti-
vate managers to undertake specific investments that are not con-
tractible. Since the investments are specific, managers are not moved
by reputational concerns. In fact, if the investments were not specific,
managers would undertake them even if they had very few rights of
control, i.e., very little power. Another interesting point of compari-
son is Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) model of formal and real authority,
which is also based on the idea that power makes managers undertake
uncontractible actions. In their article, powerful managers have better
incentives to collect information because, with more information, they
can more easily identify the decisions that maximize their private ben-
efits. If there is some congruence between a manager’s and his firm’s
objectives, the firm itself ends up benefiting from the information that
the manager collects; but this comes at a cost: when the decisions pre-
ferred by the manager are different from the ones preferred by the
firm, the manager does what he prefers. In contrast with Aghion and
Tirole (1997), I argue that, although managers may use their power
inefficiently, competition in the market for executives is strong and
limits this type of behavior. In fact, because top managers may have
many temptations, we should expect the labor market to make them
1 An exception is Sauer (1988), who studied how the quality of joint publications
affected the earnings of professors. He found that the effect of coauthored articles on
individual earnings was inversely proportional to the number of coauthors. This evi-
dence is consistent with our theory, because as the number of coauthors increases, each
author has less power over the article.
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very accountable for their firm’s performance. Finally, for similar rea-
sons, the theory that I present is quite different from some theories
where the role of power is to protect the managers’ careers from
potential threats. For example, in Carmichael (1988), tenured profes-
sors have an incentive to hire the best assistant professors because,
being tenured, they do not feel threatened by them. Friebel and Raith
(2001) has a similar flavor: subordinates must communicate with their
immediate superior before they can communicate with anyone higher
up in the hierarchy. This chain of command gives managers the assur-
ance that their subordinates will not threaten them. While in these
papers power protects managers from the (external or internal) labor
market, in my paper power exposes them to the labor market.
As a benchmark, I first analyze the optimal allocation of power
in a simple case where managers are ex ante identical and their actions
are not complementary. I show that it is optimal to divide power in
an uneven way, and find two reasons for it. First, if effort measures the
alignment of managers’ actions with the firm’s interests, then power
and effort must be complements: if a manager chooses more effort, it
is profitable for the firm to give him more power, because in that way
the organization will benefit more from the effort that the manager is
already exerting. Furthermore, having more power, the manager real-
izes that he is more visible to the market and works even harder. As
a result, it is profitable to give him even more power. Second, there
are increasing returns to power in visibility: as a manager’s power
increases, his visibility increases at an increasing rate. This result is
endogenously derived from the model, and it implies that, as we
move away from a perfectly equal distribution of power, the increase
in effort of the manager who is made more powerful is larger than the
reduction of the other manager’s effort. Although the model is based
on different assumptions and the trade-offs are of a different nature,
this result is consistent with Meyer’s (1991) idea that, when the firm
learns from coarse information, unequal distributions of power are
efficient.
After this basic analysis, I extend the model and derive impli-
cations for management practice. First, I analyze the effect of depart-
mentation on incentives in large multidivisional companies. I argue
that the practice of organizing divisions along product lines, giv-
ing to each division power over all business functions related to its
product, is consistent with the objective of making division managers
more visible. Second, I argue that the relationship between power and
seniority results from a trade-off between human-capital accumula-
tion and implicit incentives. Giving more power to younger managers
increases incentives, but it prevents the firm from using the human
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capital accumulated by older managers. Third, I show that the model
of power and career concerns is consistent with the empirical finding
that higher-level jobs are less specialized than lower-level jobs. Spe-
cialization is good for human-capital accumulation, but it reduces the
managers’ visibility and is bad for incentives. As a manager moves
up the hierarchy, the visibility effect becomes more important and the
firm has an incentive to reduce the degree of specialization. Last, I
derive implications for managerial succession, showing that the model
is consistent with the evidence found by Parrino (1997) and Huson
et al. (2001).
2. The Effect of Power on the Visibility
of Managers
2.1 A Simple Model of Power and Career Concerns
I use a model of career concerns where managers have an incen-
tive to improve firm performance in order to build a good reputa-
tion. I extend Holmstrom’s (1982b) original model in two directions.
First, I assume that firms employ two managers instead of one. I also
assume that the labor market cannot observe their individual levels of
performance: only firm performance is observable. A similar extension
has already been used by Meyer (1994) and Jeon (1996).2 This exten-
sion of Holmstrom (1982b) gives rise to a special team production
problem, where payoffs depend on the labor market’s beliefs about
the team members. Team members’ incentives are determined by a
dynamic learning process. In contrast, in the standard team produc-
tion problem (see Holmstrom, 1982a) the firm provides incentives by
designing pay-for-performance contracts. Second, I define power as
the right to influence firm performance: a more powerful manager
is someone whose decisions have a greater impact on his firm’s per-
formance. Furthermore, power is endogenous: the firm can choose
how much power to give to each manager. The distribution of power
determines the managers’ visibility and their incentives to work in the
interest of the firm.
Consider a risk-neutral firm (the principal) employing two man-
agers, A and B (the agents), in periods t ∈ {1 2}. The firm maximizes
2 There are differences. First, Meyer’s (1994) focus is on efficient task assignment
in a context where managers do not need to be given incentives, whereas I am inter-
ested precisely in the relationship between power and incentives. Second, Jeon (1996)
takes the allocation of power as given and studies the effect of team composition on
incentives. Auriol et al. (2002) use a model similar to Jeon (1996).
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the discounted sum of expected profits using δ as a discount rate, and
its technology in period t has the following form:
yt = ϕA(ηA + eAt)+ ϕB(ηB + eBt)+ εt (1)
where yt is output, ϕA is manager A’s power, eAt is manager A’s effort,
ηA is manager A’s ability and ϕB, ηB and eBt are similarly defined
for manager B. The abilities ηA and ηB are constants unknown to
everyone (including the managers themselves), and all players have
identical prior beliefs with distribution ηi ∼ N(η0 σ 2) for i ∈ {AB}
and cov(ηA ηB) = 0. The random variable εt is a productivity shock
to the firm, with εt ∼ N(0 σ 2ε ) for t ∈ {1 2}. These shocks are assumed
to be independently distributed.
The key variable in (1) is power. Since power is defined as the
right to affect firm performance, any increase in the power of a man-
ager increases the marginal effect of his effort on firm performance.
First, note that power does not reduce the variance of a manager’s per-
formance. This is different from Cerasi and Daltung’s (2000) argument
that if powerful managers make many decisions, then, by the law of
large numbers, their individual levels of performance must have a
low variance. However, it is the case that, in our model, more pow-
erful managers make larger contributions to firm performance and,
for this reason, their individual levels of performance are estimated
with higher precision. This is similar to Cerasi and Daltung (2000).
Second, note that power provides no private benefits in our model,
as opposed to Rotemberg (1993) and Aghion and Tirole (1997). This
implies that managers are not willing to pay for power, i.e., to accept
lower salaries in return for power.
As in the incomplete contracting literature (see Hart and Moore,
1990, and Aghion and Tirole, 1997), I assume that power is a limited
resource for the firm:
Assumption 1: ϕA + ϕB ≤ 1.
This restriction is realistic if power is a precise set of tasks or
responsibilities. For example, Prendergast’s (1995) definition of respon-
sibility as the number of tasks performed by an employee fits this
definition. In his model, there is a continuum of tasks defined over
the interval [0 1], and each task is assigned to one of two agents.
In the particular case where all tasks are identical, both in the effort
they require and in their marginal effect on performance, we may
interpret ϕi as the number of tasks that agent i is responsible for.
My definition of power can also be identified with one of French
and Raven’s (1959) categories. Their seminal paper distinguished four
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types of power: coercive, legitimate, expert, and referent. Legitimate
power is the power that comes from the position of a person in the for-
mal hierarchy of an organization. This matches the definition I use in
the model: legitimate power determines how much effect a manager
can have on firm performance; it is a limited resource (Assumption 1);
and it is visible to outsiders. The other types of power do not satisfy
these conditions.
The following example illustrates our assumptions. Suppose two
managers are in charge of launching a new product and have to
decide how to use their budgets. Each manager is in charge of a
different aspect of the project: manufacturing or marketing; and, for
simplicity, assume these two aspects are independent (there is no
complementarity). This assumption can be easily relaxed and will be
relaxed later on. The company has to assign a budget Ii (for i ∈ {AB})
to each manager. The new product generates returns measured by V ,
which depend on the two managers’ choices. Let VA and VB (with
VA + VB = V ) denote the returns due to A and B respectively. Ide-
ally, the firm would like to be able to decompose V into VA and VB,
i.e., to know what part of the returns produced by the new product
is attributable to the marketing and manufacturing decisions respec-
tively. However, this is usually impossible. Formally, with I = IA + IB,
the rate of return of the project is
 = V − I
I
= IA
I
VA − IA
IA
+ IB
I
VB − IB
IB

The company would like to infer separate rates of return A and B
for each manager based on V , IA, and IB. The power of a manager, in
this case, is the relative size of his budget, ϕi = Ii/I , because we can
write
 = ϕAA + ϕBB
where i = (Vi − Ii)/Ii depends on manager i’s effort.
Throughout this paper, “effort” has a broad meaning. Any action
that a manager takes is effort as long as (a) it is more costly to the
manager than to the firm; (b) it has a nonstochastic, positive effect
on current performance; and (c) the manager knows this effect better
than the firm. Internal budgeting decisions, for example, usually sat-
isfy these conditions: the effects of budgetary choices are difficult to
assess by persons who do not have as much information as the rel-
evant managers; and their costs are often different for the managers
and for the firm (managers might prefer some decisions that benefit
their own department very directly but hurt the firm as a whole).
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Another interesting example is the allocation of time or attention.
A manager may choose to devote his time to improving a particu-
lar project in one of a number of dimensions. Some dimensions might
be very important to the firm but, at the same time, uninteresting to
the manager. Other aspects might be very rewarding to the manager,
but irrelevant to the firm’s interests. In this model, managers are con-
sidered to exert more effort when the actions they take are more in
accordance with corporate objectives.
2.1.1 Labor-Market Competition. The labor market is com-
petitive and observes both firm performance and the distribution of
power. It does not observe the individual performance of each man-
ager. Labor-market competition is important because part of the man-
agers’ human capital is general:
Assumption 2: A proportion γ of a manager’s ability is general human
capital.
If the labor market believes that manager i’s ability is ηi, the mar-
ket value of that manager is γηi. With competition, this is the wage
that every firm will be willing to pay to that manager. A key assump-
tion is that the managers, the firm, and the market have exactly the
same information at every point in time: the firm does not have more
information about its managers than the labor market or the managers
themselves. If the firm were better informed about its own managers
than the rest of the labor market, the fear of transmitting too much
information to competitors would determine its distribution of power.
The firm would take into account that a manager to whom it has given
more power could use his promotion to obtain a higher wage. This
problem has been studied by Waldman (1984), Ricart-i-Costa (1988),
and Bernhardt (1995), and is not considered here.
2.1.2 Utility Functions. Both managers have the same dif-
ferentiable, strictly increasing, convex disutility of effort c(e), with
c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0, and c′(e) c′′(e) > 0 for e > 0. They also have the
same risk-neutral utility function,
U(wi1 wi2; ei1 ei2) = wi1 − c(ei1)+ δ[wi2 − c(ei2)] (2)
where wit is the wage paid to manager i ∈ {AB} in period t. The
reservation utility is also the same for both managers and is equal
to 0. The discount rate is δ for the two managers and for the principal.
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2.1.3 Timing. There are only two periods, and decisions are
made in the following order:
• The market offers each manager i a wage wmi1 for period 1. The
principal offers each manager i a position ϕi for both periods, and
a wage wi1 for period 1. Managers accept or reject the principal’s
offers.
• First-period production. Managers choose eA1 and eB1. The produc-
tivity shock ε1 is realized, and all players observe y1.
• The market offers each manager a second-period wage wmi2. The
principal offers each manager a second-period wage wi2. Managers
accept or reject the principal’s offers.
• Second-period production. Managers choose eA2 and eB2. The pro-
ductivity shock ε2 is realized, and all players observe y2.
A key assumption, as far as the timing is concerned, is that the
firm commits to keep in period 2 the allocation of power that it has
previously chosen in period 1. This assumption is correct if the fre-
quency with which the firm reallocates power is lower than the fre-
quency with which it receives information about the managers and
updates its beliefs about their abilities. For example, if managers learn
by doing, it takes them time to learn about their new responsibilities,
and job reassignments must not be too frequent.
2.2 The Effect of Power on Visibility
Let e∗it (for i ∈ {AB} and t ∈ {1 2}) be the equilibrium levels of effort
chosen by the managers. The normality assumptions imply that the
posterior beliefs about ability are a weighted average of today’s signal
and all past signals (see De Groot, 1970). In particular, at t = 1
ηA1 = (1− αA1)η0 + αA1
(
z1
ϕA
− ϕB
ϕA
η0
)
 (3)
where
αA1 ≡
ϕ2Aσ
2
A
ϕ2Aσ
2
A + ϕ2Bσ 2B + σ 2ε
(4)
and z1 = y1 − ϕAe∗A1 − ϕBe∗B1. A similar formula applies to manager B.
In the above expression ηA1 = E(ηA|y1), the posterior beliefs about
manager A’s ability conditional on period-1 performance. The coeffi-
cient αA1 measures the rate at which the principal updates his beliefs
about A: the higher αA1, the more the principal blames this manager
for a bad result or rewards him for a good one. Hence αA1 measures
accountability.
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FIGURE 1. UPDATING COEFFICIENT FOR MANAGER A
Lemma 1: If σ 2A = σ 2B = σ 2, then (i) αi1 is increasing in ϕi; (ii) there
exists ϕ˜i > 0 such that αi1 exhibits increasing returns to power if ϕi < ϕ˜i
and decreasing returns to power if ϕi > ϕ˜i; and (iii) ϕ˜i ≤ 1 if σε ≤ σ and
ϕ˜i > 1 if σε > σ .
Proof. See Appendix. ✷
The first part of the lemma states that more powerful managers
are held more accountable, because the labor market can have more
precise information about their abilities. The second part of the lemma
is illustrated in Figure 1, where αA1 is plotted as a function of ϕA
for a given value of σ 2ε (σ
2
ε = 1) and different values of σ 2A = σ 2B .
Lower curves correspond to higher prior variances. There are increas-
ing returns to power when power is low, and decreasing returns to
power when power is high.
Despite this ambiguity, increasing returns to power dominate
as far as team incentives are concerned. Before we present a formal
proof, let us explain the intuition for it. First, note that we are always
more likely to update our beliefs about a manager when our prior
beliefs about him are weak. Second, the same logic applies to the
team of managers considered as a whole: the weaker our prior beliefs
about the team, the more quickly we will update them. Third, our
prior beliefs about the team are always more precise when we divide
power more equally: in that case we have a more diversified portfo-
lio of managers, and there will be less uncertainty about the team’s
performance. Therefore, if power is distributed more equally between
the managers, the beliefs about the team will be updated more slowly.
Finally, if the updating is slower, then the incentives of the team as a
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whole will also be lower. This means that there are increasing returns
to power because, if we move away from the perfectly even distribu-
tion of power, the increase in one of the managers’ incentives will be
greater than the reduction in the other manager’s incentives.
More formally, note that the sum of the updating coefficients is
αA1 + αB1 =
(ϕ2A + ϕ2B)σ 2
(ϕ2A + ϕ2B)σ 2 + σ 2ε
= σ
2
J (ϕA)
σ 2J (ϕA)+ σ 2ε

where σ 2J (ϕA) = (ϕ2A+ϕ2B)σ 2 is the prior variance of the team’s produc-
tivity, and is minimized at ϕi = 12 . This sum determines the incentives
of the team as a whole. Now suppose that the principal had hired
only one manager, with prior ability ϕAη0+ϕBη0 = η0 and prior vari-
ance σ 2J (ϕA). According to the Bayesian updating rules, the principal
would use a rate αA1 + αB1 to update his beliefs about this imaginary
manager.3 But this rate is higher the higher the prior uncertainty about
the manager:
Lemma 2: The sum αA1+αB1 is maximized at ϕ∗i ∈ {0 1} and minimized
at ϕ∗i = 12 . Furthermore, it is increasing in σ 2 and decreasing in σ 2ε .
The rate of updating for the imaginary manager, αA1 + αB1, is
maximized at the corners (ϕ∗i ∈ {0 1}), because this is where the prior
uncertainty about his ability is highest. Hence, as far as the team of
managers is concerned, there are increasing returns to power in learn-
ing and incentives.
3. The Optimal Allocation of Power:
A Benchmark
Suppose that managers are ex ante identical (ηA0 = ηB0 = η0 and
σ 2A = σ 2B = σ 2). To analyze the optimal distribution of power, let
wi t(ηi t−1 e
∗
i t) be the wage that the firm offers to manager i in period
t given his expected ability (ηi t−1) and effort (e∗i t). Similarly, let
wmi t(ηi t−1) denote the wage offered to manager i by the labor market
in period t. Labor-market competition imposes the constraints
wi t(ηi t−1 e
∗
i t)− c(e∗i t) = wmi t(ηi t−1)
wmi t(ηi t−1) = γηi t−1 (5)
for i ∈ {AB} and t ∈ {1 2}: because of labor-market competition,
managers obtain a salary raise every time they are believed to have
3 In the single-manager case, with yt = η+εt , η ∼ N(η0 σ 2), and εt ∼ N(0 σ 2ε ), the
posterior ability is η1 = (1 − α1)η0 + α1y1 and the updating rate is α1 = σ 2/(σ 2 + σ 2ε ).
Hence, when there is a single manager for whom prior beliefs have a variance of σ 2J (ϕA),
the rate of updating will be σ 2J /(σ
2
J + σ 2ε ).
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a higher ability. Note that more powerful managers are paid higher
salaries because they have to be compensated for their higher levels
of effort. This would not be so if power produced private benefits for
managers, as in Rotemberg (1993) and Aghion and Tirole (1997).
Managers have an incentive to choose high levels of effort in
the first period: by doing so they can improve performance, make
the market believe that their ability is high, and earn higher wages
in period 2. However, such incentives do not exist in the last period,
and e∗A2 = e∗B2 = 0. The incentive-compatibility constraint for period 1
is
e∗i1 = argmax
ei1
[δγηi1 − c(ei1)] (6)
which leads to c′(e∗i1) = δγαi1; and the individual rationality con-
straints are
wi1 + δE(wi2)− c(ei1) ≥ 0
wi2 ≥ 0 (7)
When posterior abilities happen to be negative, the second constraint
in (7) will be binding. However, following a simplification that is stan-
dard in this literature, we ignore this possibility. This is a good approx-
imation only if the prior mean η0 is high and negative posterior values
for ηi happen with very small probabilities.
Under these assumptions, the optimal allocation of power is
uneven, as shown by the following result:
Proposition 1: If managers are ex ante identical, it is optimal to dis-
tribute power in an uneven way (ϕ∗A = ϕ∗B). Moreover, if c(eit) = e2it/2, the
optimal allocation of power is a corner solution (ϕ∗A ∈ {0 1}).
Proof. See Appendix. ✷
There are two reasons for this result. First, the effect of power
on learning and incentives is not linear: there are increasing returns to
power (Lemmas 1 and 2). Second, power and effort are complements
in (1), and this complementarity plays a key role. In fact, suppose that
power is equally distributed between A and B, and imagine that A, for
an exogenous reason, decides to choose a higher level of effort. The
firm will have an incentive to give A more power, in order to benefit
more from his higher effort. Having more power, A will have stronger
career concerns and will work even harder, making it profitable for
the firm to give him even more power. Meanwhile, as A’s power
increases, B has less and less power, and chooses to exert less and
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less effort. However, although this is costly to the firm, this cost is
smaller and smaller, because B has less and less power, and therefore
his effort has less and less importance. Thus very small differences
in the managers’ propensities to work can lead to very large power
differences.
Meyer (1991) proposed a different reason why learning could
lead to unequal distributions of power. She analyzed a promotion
contest as a device used by the firm to learn about its promotion can-
didates. She found that the introduction of a bias toward the favorite
candidate would improve learning. Proposition 1 is different from
Meyer’s (1991) result in two respects. First, her article identifies pure
learning effects and does not link these learning effects to the incen-
tives of managers, as opposed to Proposition 1. Second, in her model
the firm can only use order statistics to learn about the employees. In
my model, the firm also uses coarse information, but the coarseness is
of a different kind: team performance is observed, but individual per-
formance is not. However, despite these two differences, the existence
of increasing returns to power in my model is consistent with Meyer’s
(1991) idea that, when the firm is learning from coarse information, it
is not profitable to give the same power to all the employees that it
wants to learn about.
The result in Proposition 1 is robust to the introduction of explicit
incentive schemes. If the firm can offer linear incentives (as in Gibbons
and Murphy, 1992) and incentives are based on firm performance,
the firm will still choose to divide power in an unequal way, as the
following proposition shows.
Proposition 2: Suppose the two managers are ex ante identical, the firm
can offer linear contracts wit = ai + bityt (i ∈ {AB}, t ∈ {1 2}), and
c(eit) = e2it/2. Then the optimal allocation of power is a corner solution
(ϕ∗A ∈ {0 1}).
Proof. See Appendix. ✷
When managers are risk-neutral, optimal explicit incentives
make them behave as residual claimants, and efforts move up to first-
best levels. But first-best efforts are increasing functions of power:
since the effort of more powerful managers has a larger effect on
firm performance, in a first-best world they should work harder. In
fact, the first-best level of effort is ei1 = ϕi. Since first-best efforts are
increasing functions of power, effort and power are complements,
and the optimal allocation of power is uneven.
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4. Extensions and Managerial Implications
The main strength of our model lies in its ability to produce qualita-
tive predictions on how to distribute power in different contexts. The
effect of power on the managers’ visibility matters because it imposes
constraints on several personnel and organizational decisions. The
following extensions of the model are intended to illustrate this
point. For simplicity, a quadratic cost function [c(eit) = e2it/2] is used
throughout this section.
4.1 Power and Departmentation
Multidivisional companies usually combine two basic criteria for
departmentation: a functional criterion and a market-based criterion.
Functional departmentation creates units responsible for each of the
business functions (finance, operations, marketing, and personnel).
Market-oriented departmentation creates units responsible for a prod-
uct line, a physical area, or some other market-dependent variable.
According to Mintzberg (1979), “divisions are created according to
markets served and are then given control over the operating func-
tions required to serve these markets” (p. 381). For example, in many
companies each division is responsible for a different product line,
but its internal departmentation follows functional lines.
This pattern of departmentation has two interesting features.
First, there is one market measure that makes it possible to assess the
performance of each division, and one manager (the head of the divi-
sion) is responsible for that measure of performance. This is consistent
with our previous results: if an observable measure of performance is
available, it is profitable to make a single manager responsible for it.
In this way, the division manager is more visible than he would be
if his division were responsible for a business function rather than
a product. Second, consider the managers who are one level below
the division head. Each of them has responsibility over one of the
business functions, and, as a consequence, their responsibilities are
complementary. This provides division heads with more power. If a
product manager is given power over finance, marketing, and opera-
tions, but not personnel, he can always argue that the progress of his
division is hindered by inadequate personnel policies. This division
head would be more visible (and more accountable) if he were made
responsible for all business functions, not just because he would have
more power, but because any of his decisions would be more fully
implemented and would have a larger effect on his division’s perfor-
mance. If the company decided to give him more power by giving
him control of an activity unrelated to his other responsibilities, his
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visibility would not increase as much. Hence the most effective way
to increase a manager’s power is to give him more decision rights on
dimensions that complement the ones he is already in charge of.
Another interesting issue is how the firm should divide power
between the managers who belong to the same division and are imme-
diately below the head. If each of these managers is responsible for
one of the business functions, their efforts are complementary, and
our initial production function, given by (1), has to be redefined. We
can take intradivisional complementarities into account by assuming
yt = ϕA(ηA + eAt)+ ϕB(ηB + eBt)+ ζϕAeAtϕBeBt + εt (8)
where the importance of complementarities is measured by ζ . This
parameter measures to what extent responsibilities are divided along
complementary lines. With c(eit) = e2it/2, the incentive compatibility
constraint (for manager A) is
eA1 = δγ(αA1 + ζϕBeB1) (9)
and in a Nash equilibrium
e∗A1 = δγαA1
1+ δγζϕBαB1
1− δ2γ2ζ2ϕAϕBαA1αB1
 (10)
Proposition 3: Suppose that the managers’ actions are complementary
as in (8), with the degree of complementarity being measured by ζ . Then
there is a value ζ0 > 0 such that for every ζ > ζ0 the even distribution of
power ϕA = 12 is preferred to the uneven distribution of power ϕA ∈ {0 1};
and for every ζ < ζ0 the uneven distribution ϕA ∈ {0 1} is preferred to the
even distribution ϕA = 12 .
Proof. See Appendix. ✷
Consider the managers who are immediately below the division
head. If each of these managers is responsible for one of the business
functions, then ζ > 0. According to Proposition 3, power should be
divided on a rather equal basis among these managers, even taking
into account that this will make them less visible. Thus our model
provides a rationale for the type of organizational structure where
each division is responsible for all the business functions related to
a specific product and managers responsible for the various business
functions have similar amounts of power. First, the division head is
made more visible in this way, because there exists an observable
(but noisy) measure of his performance. Second, the division head has
more influence on his division’s performance, because he can use all
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FIGURE 2. TOTAL EXPECTED VALUEWITH COMPLEMENTARITIES
business functions to implement his decisions. Third, by giving simi-
lar amounts of power to all functional managers, the lack of visibility
of these managers is compensated by the fact that their complemen-
tarities will be more fully exploited.
The model also shows some determinants of power differences
among managers. Figure 2 plots total expected value as a function
of ϕA for different values of ζ .4 The left-hand side represents the
symmetric case, where managers are a priori identical, while the right-
hand side shows the case where prior information about manager A
is less precise than that about manager B (σ 2A > σ
2
B). In the left graph,
higher plots correspond to higher ζ ′s: as complementarities become
stronger, the optimal allocation of power becomes more equal. In the
plot on the right, the asymmetry leads to giving more power to man-
ager A than to manager B: when differences in ability are not sub-
stantial, the firm should give more power to younger managers who
are eager to prove themselves. Asymmetries in prior abilities yield
similar results: holding everything else equal for the two managers, if
ηA0 > ηB0 then more power should be given to A than to B. Similarly,
if A′s job has a higher content of general human capital (higher γ for
A than for B) then A should have more power than B.
4 More precisely, we have plotted E0(y1− c(eA1)− c(eB1)). In fact, the expected total
value is E0(y1− c(eA1)− c(eB1)+δ(y2− c(eA2)− c(eB2))), but eA2 = eB2 = 0 independently
of the allocation of power; and we are also considering ηA0 = ηB0 = η0. Hence there
is no loss of generality from looking at the first-period value only. To generate the
plot we have chosen c(e) = 05e2, ηA0 = ηB0 = 1, γ = δ = 05, σ 2ε = 1, σ 2B = 1, and
ζ ∈ {0 1 2 3 4 45 5 55 6}. In the left-hand side σ 2A = σ 2B = 1, and in the right-hand
side σ 2A = 13 > σ 2B . These results are robust to different parameter values.
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4.2 Power and Seniority
A traditional feature of internal labor markets is the high posi-
tive correlation between power and seniority, i.e., the fact that an
employee’s progression within an organization depends crucially on
his in-the-firm tenure. Referring to blue-collar workers employed in
manufacturing, Doeringer and Piore (1971) observed that “promo-
tions to nonentry jobs are generally determined by fixed standards
of seniority and ability.” Seltzer and Merrett (2000), referring to
white-collar jobs in a bank, reported that “even when forthcoming,
promotion was typically slow.” However, both Seltzer and Merrett
(2000) and Baker et al. (1994) find evidence of fast tracks—quick paths
of promotion.
The weight given to seniority is usually explained by the impor-
tance of human-capital accumulation, and the existence of fast tracks
is usually related to sorting: on the one hand, if higher-level jobs
require substantially more human capital, then seniority must be
strongly correlated with power. On the other hand, the firm should
also be able to promote more quickly employees who have greater
abilities and therefore learn more quickly. Thus, fast tracks are also
needed. However, although fast tracks can be viewed as a sorting
mechanism, they also have clear effects on incentives: fast tracks
produce younger managers, and younger managers have different
incentives than older managers.
A simple consequence of our model is that younger managers
have stronger career concerns than older managers, and therefore
will choose higher levels of effort than the latter. However, this is
so because our model does not take human-capital accumulation into
account. Let us now assume that there is a rate λ of on-the-job learn-
ing, and as a consequence of that the prior ability of an employee i
with τ periods of tenure is θi0 = (1 + λ)τ . To simplify, consider the
case without complementarities (ζ = 0) where, by Proposition 1, the
optimal allocation is either ϕA = 1 or ϕB = 1, and comparisons are par-
ticularly simple. On the one hand, more-senior managers have more
human capital, and therefore a higher prior ability (θA0 > θB0). On the
other hand, the firm knows their abilities much better (σ 2A < σ
2
B) and
these managers will have less incentives to prove their value. Hence,
giving more power to young managers is more advantageous if the
abilities of junior and senior managers are not too different, as shown
by the following result.
Proposition 4: Suppose manager A’s tenure is τ > 1 periods and man-
ager B’s tenure is one period. Suppose managers accumulate human capital
at a rate λ per period, and suppose that the precision about the managers’
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abilities increases at a rate l per period. Then for every l < τ1/(τ−1)− 1 there
exists a λ0(l) > 0 such that ϕ∗A = 1 if λ > λ0(l) and ϕ∗B = 1 if λ < λ0(l).
Furthermore, λ0(l) is increasing in l.
Proof. See Appendix. ✷
The interest of this simple result lies in its implications for the
allocation of power in different environments. First, consider new
vs. traditional lines of activity. In newer activities senior employ-
ees are not necessarily better trained than junior employees. Hence,
power should be given to the latter. This is the case, for example, in
jobs requiring high information-technology skills: young employees
in software companies can be promoted as quickly as older employ-
ees, because the knowledge needed for higher-level jobs is very new.
Second, some jobs require employees to set objectives or to design
plans, while other jobs require employees to implement the plans that
others have established. The former jobs require mostly experience,
and the latter require a lot of time and effort, but not necessarily a lot
of expertise. According to our model, junior managers can be given
considerable responsibility in activities requiring a large of amount of
time or attention and little expertise. Third, there are activities where
the knowledge that is needed is cumulative in nature and activities
where it is not. For example, legal or medical jobs require qualifica-
tions that depend heavily on experience. Similarly, supervision jobs
require experience, because a supervisor needs to know the character-
istics of the jobs that he is supervising. In these cases, seniority should
be a more important determinant of an employee’s position. In other
types of activities, the qualifications that are required do not depend
very much on previous experience, but depend to a large extent on the
employee’s effort. In these cases, seniority should be a less important
determinant of power.
4.3 Power and Specialization
A stylized fact in organizations is that higher-level jobs are wider, i.e.,
include more tasks or more diverse ones, than lower-level jobs. Top
managerial jobs are usually seen as prototypes of nonspecialization:
for example, according to Mintzberg (1979, pp. 79–80), “these roles
managers perform are so varied, and so much switching is required
among them in the course of any given day, that managerial jobs are
typically the least specialized in the organization.”
Narrow job definitions have costs and benefits. Specialized man-
agers can be more productive than nonspecialized managers because
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they are able to concentrate their learning on a specific issue, of which
they become experts. However, good firm performance always results
from a variety of complementary decisions for which different types
of expertise are needed. Therefore, generalists are more visible to the
outside labor market than specialists: a generalist is more likely to be
held accountable than a specialist, who is only responsible for a lim-
ited (and difficult to isolate) aspect of the problem. Thus, the firm has
to choose between developing specialists, who will become experts
but will be less visible to the outside market, and developing gener-
alists, who will not be experts but will be more visible to the outside
market.
Note that, in the model, any of the corner solutions (ϕi = 1) max-
imizes autonomy and minimizes the degree of specialization; and the
middle solution, ϕA = ϕB = 12 , maximizes the degree of specialization
of the team.5 Because the technology given by (1) does not take into
account the benefits of specialization, we now consider the following
alternative function:
yt =
√
ϕA(ηA + eAt)+
√
ϕB(ηB + eBt)+ εt (11)
This new production function takes into account the trade-off between
specialization and autonomy: more autonomy makes a manager more
visible and hence generates incentives; but it also reduces specializa-
tion and makes the manager less productive. With this technology, the
updating coefficient is simply
αA1 =
ϕAσ
2
A
ϕAσ
2
A + ϕBσ 2B + σ 2ε
 (12)
Figure 3 shows expected total value as a function of ϕA for differ-
ent values of σ 2ε .
6 The upper curve corresponds to the case where firm
performance is measured with high precision (σ 2ε is low): in this case,
the benefits of autonomy are higher and the power allocation should
be relatively uneven. The lower curve, where equality is optimal, cor-
responds to a case where performance measurements are difficult (σ 2ε
is high).
5 If ϕA is very small, manager A will be very specialized, but in that case ϕB will be
very large, and manager B will not be specialized. Maximum specialization is reached
when power is divided equally.
6 We have again plotted E0(y1 − c(eA1)− c(eB1)) using c(e) = 008e2, ηA0 = ηB0 = 1,
γ = δ = 05, σ 2A = σ 2B = 1, and σ 2ε ∈ {005 15}. As in previous plots, these results are
robust and the particular parameter values have only been chosen to make the figure
illustrative.
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FIGURE 3. AUTONOMY VS. SPECIALIZATION
Proposition 5: If managers are a priori identical and there are benefits
to specialization (given by (11)), then there exists σ 20 (σ
2) > 0 such that: (i)
if σ 2ε < σ
2
0 , then 0 < ϕ
∗
A <
1
2 or
1
2 < ϕ
∗
A < 1; and (ii) if σ
2
ε > σ
2
0 , then
ϕ∗A = 12 . Furthermore, σ 20 (σ 2) is decreasing in σ 2.
Proof. See Appendix. ✷
This proposition has interesting implications for job design: sup-
pose we consider equation (11) at different levels of the hierarchy. As
we approach the top levels, managers become more and more visible
to the market, and σ 2ε becomes smaller. This is so independently of
whether the manager is a specialist or a generalist: no matter what
the manager does, if he is at a higher level, then the σ 2ε corresponding
to his level must be smaller. At any given level, though, the firm can
choose to use narrow or wide job definitions. According to Proposi-
tion 5, the firm should choose wider jobs as σ 2ε diminishes. Hence,
as managers move up the hierarchy, they should become generalists.
This happens because at higher positions the performance of man-
agers is more easily assessed by the market. Proposition 5 shows that
the firm has an incentive to take advantage of this increased visibility
and enlarge job definitions at those levels. On the contrary, employ-
ees are less visible at lower levels of the hierarchy, and the firm has
little to gain by using wide job definitions. Hence, the benefits of
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specialization are greater in this case, which is consistent with the
stylized fact we mentioned above.
4.4 Patterns of Managerial Succession
According to Parrino (1997), “the availability of a strong outside can-
didate is an important consideration in the decision to replace a poor
CEO.” In his study of CEO departures in the US, he found that “when
accounting performance is not substantially below that of the indus-
try, but has been declining, the potential benefits from an outside
appointment are not sufficient to outweight the costs. Consequently,
when boards decide to replace the CEO in such situations they tend to
appoint insiders.” Boards are more likely to appoint outsiders when
the firm’s performance is substantially below the industry average. A
more recent paper by Huson et al. (2001) finds similar evidence.
This finding can easily be explained with our model. Suppose
that the firm chooses an allocation of power ϕi1 for period 1 and can
change it after having observed first-period performance. Let ϕi2 be
the allocation of power in the second period. Suppose also that after
observing first-period performance the firm has the option to hire a
new manager (an outsider). Furthermore, suppose that insiders accu-
mulate human capital during the first period, while outsiders do not.
As in Section 4.2, let λ be the rate of human-capital accumulation of
insiders: then the posterior abilities, after first-period performance has
been observed, are (1+ λ)ηA1 for manager A, (1+ λ)ηB1 for manager
B, and η0 for every outsider.
Without loss of generality, suppose ϕA1 > ϕB1. Then, if ϕA2 > ϕB2,
we will consider that there is no succession in period 2; if ϕA2 < ϕB2,
we will call this an inside succession; and if the firm fires A and B and
hires an outsider for period 2, we will call this an outside succession.
Proposition 6: Suppose the firm can hire new managers at the end
of period 1. Suppose insiders accumulate human capital at a rate λ and
outsiders do not accumulate human capital. Then for every λ there exists
z(λ) < η0 such that (i) if the first-period performance is sufficiently low
(z1 < z(λ)), then outside succession takes place in period 2; (ii) if the first-
period performance is intermediate (z(λ) < z1 < η0), then inside succession
takes place in period 2; and (iii) if the first-period performance is sufficiently
high (z1 > η0), no succession takes place. Furthermore, z(λ) is decreasing
in λ.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that ϕA1 > ϕB1. In period 2,
only one of the following three choices can be optimal: (a) to give all
the power to A (no succession); (b) to give all the power to B (inside
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succession); or (c) to give all the power to a third person (outside
succession). In case (a), the second-period expected surplus will be
equal to Sa2 = (1+λ)ηA1; in case (b) it will be equal to Sb2 = (1+λ)ηB1;
and in case (c) it will be equal to Sc2 = η0.
First, option (a) will be chosen if Sa2 > S
b
2 and S
a
2 > S
c
2, which
is equivalent to z1 > η0. Second, option (b) will be chosen if S
b
2 > S
a
2
and Sb2 > S
c
2. After some manipulation, it can be found that this is
equivalent to z1 < η0 and
z1>
η0
ϕB1(1+λ)σ 2
[
ϕ2B1σ
2+ϕA1ϕB1(1+λ)σ 2−λϕ2A1σ 2−λσ 2ε
]≡z(λ) (13)
which completes the proof. ✷
This proposition is consistent with the evidence found by Par-
rino (1997) and Huson et al. (2001). These authors find that the prob-
ability of a fired CEO being replaced by an outsider is more sensitive
to firm performance, measured by industry-adjusted return on assets,
than the probability of a fired CEO being replaced by an insider. This
means that fired CEOs are more likely to be replaced by insiders
when firm performance is close to industry performance; and CEOs
are more likely to be replaced by outsiders when firm performance is
substantially below the industry average.
5. Conclusions
I have argued that the allocation of power at top levels of the hierar-
chy affects the visibility of managers, and, if labor markets are com-
petitive, their visibility has an effect on incentives. Hence, if labor
markets are competitive, one way to align the objectives of top man-
agers with those of shareholders is to define their responsibilities in a
way that maximizes their visibility. This article makes two basic con-
tributions in this direction. First, it shows that if firms want to make
their managers more visible, they will distribute power in an unequal
way. This is not an obvious result, because making a manager very
powerful (very visible) implies making other managers less power-
ful (less visible). Second, the article goes beyond this basic result and
analyzes how companies can design jobs in order to increase their
managers’ visibility. I argue that the criteria of departmentation, the
importance given to seniority, and the width of job definitions are
some of the variables that the firm can use for that purpose.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Differentiating αA1 with respect to ϕA, we find ∂αA1/∂ϕA > 0, and
∂2αA1/∂ϕ
2
A > 0 or ∂
2αA1/∂ϕ
2
A < 0 depending on whether ϕA is low or
high.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Since managers are ex ante identical, they have the same prior abil-
ity, and the distribution of power only affects output through effort.
Hence the optimal allocation of power maximizes
S1(ϕA) = ϕAe∗A1 + ϕBe∗B1 − c
(
e∗A1
)− c(e∗B1)
where c′(e∗A1) = δγαA1 and c′(e∗B1) = δγαB1. The function St(ϕA) gives
the total surplus in period t. As of period 0, total surplus in period
2, S2(ϕA), is not a function of ϕA and therefore does not need to be
considered.
First, I show that ϕA = 12 is a local minimum: the first-order con-
dition is
e∗A1 − e∗B1 + ϕA
∂e∗A1
∂ϕA
+ ϕB
∂e∗B1
∂ϕA
− γδαA1
∂e∗A1
∂ϕA
− γδαB1
∂e∗B1
∂ϕA
= 0
using the incentive compatibility constraints. Since the two managers
are ex ante identical, it is easily verified that ϕA = 12 satisfies this
condition. On the other hand, the second-order condition evaluated
at ϕA = 12 is, after some manipulation,(
4− 2γδ∂αA1
∂ϕA
)
∂e∗A1
∂ϕA
> 0 (14)
which is satisfied because
∂αA1
∂ϕA
= 2σ
2
σ 2 + 2σ 2ε
at ϕA = 12 . Hence ϕA = 12 is a local minimum and cannot be a global
maximum.
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Second, I show that if c(eit) = e2it/2, then the optimal allocation
is the corner solution ϕA ∈ {0 1}. With a quadratic cost function, we
have
S1(1) = δγ
[
σ 2
σ 2 + σ 2ε
− δγ
2
(
σ 2
σ 2 + σ 2ε
)2]
(15)
and
S1(ϕA) = δγ
( (
ϕ3A + ϕ3B
)
σ 2(
ϕ2A + ϕ2B
)
σ 2 + σ 2ε
− δγ
2
(
ϕ4A + ϕ4B
)
σ 4[(
ϕ2A + ϕ2B
)
σ 2 + σ 2ε
]2
)
 (16)
To prove that S1(1) > S1(ϕA) for every ϕA ∈ (0 1), it suffices
to prove that the following stronger condition is satisfied for every
ϕA ∈ (0 1) and every δ and γ:
σ 2
σ 2 + σ 2ε
− 1
2
(
σ 2
σ 2 + σ 2ε
)2
>
(
ϕ3A + ϕ3B
)
σ 2(
ϕ2A + ϕ2B
)
σ 2 + σ 2ε
− 1
2
(
ϕ4A + ϕ4B
)
σ 4[(
ϕ2A + ϕ2B
)
σ 2 + σ 2ε
]2  (17)
Developing this inequality, we obtain the following equivalent condi-
tion:
σ 4 + 2σ 2σ 2ε
2(σ 2 + σ 2ε )2
≥
[
2
(
ϕ5A + ϕ5B
)− (ϕA − ϕB)2]σ 4 + 2(ϕ3A + ϕ3B)σ 2σ 2ε
2
[(
ϕ2A + ϕ2B
)
σ 2 + σ 2ε
]2  (18)
The left-hand side of this inequality is not a function of ϕA, and the
right-hand side is U-shaped with a minimum at ϕA = 12 . Moreover,
at ϕA = 12 condition (18) is satisfied with equality. Since (18) implies
(17), we have proved that the optimal allocation of power is a corner
solution. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose the firm can offer the managers linear contracts of the form
wit = ai+bityt. First, note that in period 2 it will be optimal to set b∗A2 =
b∗B2 = 1, and as a consequence we will have e∗A2 = ϕA and e∗B2 = ϕB. To
find this it suffices to maximize total period-2 surplus, S2(ϕA), with
respect to bA2 and bB2. The solution is straightforward, because, man-
agers being risk-neutral, it is optimal to make them residual claimants.
23
Second, note that period-2 salaries will depend on period-1 perfor-
mance:
a∗A2 = γηA1 + c
(
eA2
)− bA2(ϕAηA1 + ϕBηB1 + ϕAe∗A2 + ϕBe∗B2) (19)
Third, consider the period-1 problem. Manager A will choose
effort so as to maximize his expected stream of income. Hence, if
c(eit) = e2it/2 his incentive compatability (IC) constraint is
e∗A1 =
∂wA1
∂eA1
+ δ∂E(wA2)
∂eA1
 (20)
where E(wA2) is conditional on the information that manager A has
at the end of period 1. This yields
e∗A1 = bA1ϕA + δ
[
γαA1 − ϕA
(
αA1 + αB1
)]
(21)
and an optimal incentive rate
b∗A1 = 1+ δ
(
αA1 + αB1 − γ
αA1
ϕA
)
 (22)
Substituting this back into (21) yields e∗A1 = ϕA = e∗A2, and similarly
e∗B1 = ϕB = e∗B2. As a consequence, it is optimal to choose ϕA ∈ {0 1}.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
With complementarities, the total expected surplus is given by
Sc1(ϕA) = ϕAe∗A1 + ϕBe∗B1 + ζϕAe∗A1ϕBe∗B1 − c
(
e∗A1
)− c(e∗B1) (23)
where effort levels are given by expression (9). First, note that Sc1(1) =
S1(1) and is not a function of ζ :
Sc1(1) = e∗A1(1)−
e∗2A1(1)
2
 (24)
where
e∗A1(1) =
δγσ 2
σ 2 + σ 2ε
 (25)
Second, note that
Sc1
(
1
2
) = e∗A1( 12)+ (ζ4 − 1
)
e∗2A1
(
1
2
)
 (26)
where
e∗A1
(
1
2
) = 4δγσ 2(2σ 2 + 4σ 2ε )+ 2δ2γ2ζσ 4
4
(
2σ 2 + 4σ 2ε
)2 − δ2γ2ζ2σ 4  (27)
Third, by Proposition 1, if ζ = 0 then Sc1
(
1
2
)
< Sc1(1).
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Fourth, it can also be proved that Sc1
(
1
2
)
is increasing in ζ . This is
so because total expected surplus is increasing in effort when effort is
below the first-best level, and in this case effort is below the first-best
level: first-best effort is given by
eFBA1 =
ϕA + ζϕAϕ2B
1− ζ2ϕ2Aϕ2B
 (28)
and second-best effort is given by (10). Hence e∗A1 < e
FB
A1 if
δγαA1(1+ δγζϕBαB1)(1− ζ2ϕ2Aϕ2B)
< (ϕ2A + ζϕAϕ2B)(1− δ2γ2ζ2ϕAϕBαA1αB1) (29)
Rearranging terms, this condition can be proved to be equivalent to
the condition[(
ϕ2A + ϕ2B
)
σ 2 + σ 2ε
][(
1+ ζϕ2B
)(
ϕ2A + ϕ2B
)− δγϕA(1− ζ2ϕ2Aϕ2B)]σ 2
+ (1+ ζϕ2B)σ 2ε − δ2γ2ζϕAϕ3B(1+ ζϕ2A)σ 4 > 0 (30)
This condition is satisfied if γ ≤ 12 , and γ ≤ 12 must be satisfied,
because otherwise the firm would have negative profits.
Finally, Sc1
(
1
2
)
is not bounded above. This is proved by noting
that, according to (10), when ζ increases, effort levels increase mono-
tonically and with no upper bound. Hence there is a high enough
value of ζ for which Sc1
(
1
2
)
> Sc1(1). This completes the proof of the
proposition.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
First, given the rates of learning λ and l, the prior means and variances
in period 0 are θA0 = (1+λ)τθ0, θB0 = (1+λ)θ0, σ 2A = σ 2/(1+ l)τ , and
σ 2B = σ 2/(1+ l).
Second, since there are no complementarities in the production
function, there are two possible optimal allocations of power: ϕ∗A = 1
and ϕ∗B = 1.
Let e∗A1 be the effort level chosen by A when ϕA = 1, and let
e∗B1 be the effort level chosen by B when ϕB = 1. Furthermore, define
g(e) = e − e2/2. Then
e∗A1 = δγ
σ 2
σ 2 + σ 2ε (1+ l)τ
 (31)
e∗B1 = δγ
σ 2
σ 2 + σ 2ε (1+ l)
 (32)
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and
S1(0) = θB0 + g
(
e∗B1
)
 (33)
S1(1) = θA0 + g
(
e∗A1
)
 (34)
Therefore S1(1) > S1(0) if
θA0 − θB0 > g
(
e∗B1
)− g(e∗A1) (35)
Third, the left-hand side of this inequality does not depend on l
and is increasing in λ.
Fourth, the right-hand side does not depend on λ, and we can
show that it is increasing in l if l < τ1/(τ−1) − 1. Differentiating the
right-hand side with respect to l,
g ′
(
e∗B1
)∂e∗B1
∂l
− g ′(e∗A1)∂e∗A1∂l  (36)
Since e∗A1 < e
∗
B1, we have g
′(e∗A1) > g
′(e∗B1) > 0. Moreover,∣∣∣∣∂e∗A1∂l
∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∂e∗B1∂l
∣∣∣∣⇔ ( σ 2 + (1+ l)σ 2εσ 2 + (1+ l)τσ 2ε
)2
>
1
τ(1+ l)τ−1
⇔ σ
2 + (1+ l)σ 2ε
σ 2 + (1+ l)τσ 2ε
>
1√
τ(1+ l)(τ−1)/2
⇔ [√τ(1+ l)(τ−1)/2 − 1]σ 2
+ [√τ(1+ l)(τ+1)/2 − (1+ l)τ]σ 2ε > 0 (37)
for which a sufficient condition is l < τ1/(τ−1) − 1. If this condition is
satisfied, expression (37) is positive, and the right-hand side of (35) is
increasing in l. This completes the proof of Proposition 4.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Let Ŝ1(ϕA) denote the total surplus in period 1. Using the incentive-
compatibility constraints,
Ŝ1(ϕA) = δγ
σ 2
σ 2 + σ 2ε
(
ϕ3/2A + ϕ3/2B −
δγ
2
(
ϕ2A + ϕ2B
) σ 2
σ 2 + σ 2ε
)
+ (√ϕA +√ϕB)η0 (38)
for ϕA ∈ (0 1), and
Ŝ1(1) = δγ
σ 2
σ 2 + σ 2ε
(
1− δγ
2
σ 2
σ 2 + σ 2ε
)
+ η0 (39)
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Maximizing Ŝ1(ϕA) with respect to ϕA, we find the following first-
order condition:(
ϕ−1/2A − ϕ−1/2B
)
η0
= δγ σ
2
σ 2 + σ 2ε
(
δγ
σ 2
σ 2 + σ 2ε
(ϕA − ϕB)− 32
(
ϕ1/2A − ϕ1/2B
))
 (40)
The analysis of this first-order condition delivers the following results.
First, both sides of (40) are strictly decreasing in ϕA in the interval
[0, 1] (shown by differentiation). Second, both sides are equal to zero
at ϕA = 12 . Third, the left side tends to plus infinity as ϕA approaches
0 and tends to minus infinity as ϕA approaches 1. Fourth, the right
side tends to finite numbers as ϕA approaches 0 or 1. Fifth, the slopes
of the left and the right sides increase, in absolute value, as ϕA moves
away from 12 . Finally, as ϕA moves away from
1
2 , the (absolute value
of the) slope of the left side increases more than the (absolute value
of the) slope of the right side.
Proposition 5 follows from these results. First, it is never optimal
to choose ϕA ∈ {0 1}, because ŜϕA is increasing in ϕA at ϕA = 0 and
decreasing in ϕA at ϕA = 1. The optimal allocation of power is always
an interior solution.
Second, the second-order condition for a local maximum is sat-
isfied at 12 if
δγ
σ 2
σ 2 + σ 2ε
(
3
√
2
2
− 2δγ σ
2
σ 2 + σ 2ε
)
< 2
√
2η0 (41)
i.e., at ϕA = 12 the left side of (40) is steeper than the right side of it.
Furthermore, in that case ϕA = 12 is the only local maximum. This is
so because, as we move ϕA away from
1
2 , the slope of the left side of
(40) increases more than the slope of the right side of (40).
Third, the second order condition for a local minimum is satisfied
at ϕA = 12 if at that point the left side of (40) is flatter than the right
side of (40), i.e., condition (41) is not satisfied. Furthermore, in that
case there will be two and only two local maxima. This is so because,
as we move ϕA away from
1
2 , the slope of the left side of (40) increases
more than the slope of the right side. Hence the left and right sides
of (40) cross again at two points other than 12 (at 0 < ϕA <
1
2 and at
1
2 < ϕA < 1). These two crossings correspond to local maxima.
Finally, the left side of (41) is increasing in σ 2 and decreasing in
σ 2ε , and the right side is independent of these variables. This completes
the proof of Proposition 5.
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